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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [EFIN](#) [ETTC](#) [KTFN](#) [IR](#) [RS](#)  
SUBJECT: IRAN: SANCTIONS DECREE SUBJECT OF INTERAGENCY  
DISCUSSIONS

REF: A. STATE 14071

[1](#)B. STATE 16917

Classified By: Pol/Min Counselor Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).

[1](#)1. (C) We discussed reftel requests regarding implementation of UNSCR 1737 (Iran) with Vladimir Safronkov, Chief of the UN Political Affairs Section in the MFA's International Organizations Department. Safronkov told us that a draft presidential decree necessary to implement the sanctions regime was still being discussed in the Russian interagency, but reassured us that "we're getting closer" to an agreed text.

[1](#)2. (C) Safronkov told us that the primary stumbling block was obtaining interagency agreement on language to implement proliferation finance measures. The MFA believed that the President already had sufficient legal authority to implement UN resolutions, but this legal interpretation had not been shared by other agencies responsible for implementation, including the Financial Monitoring Service and Central Bank. These agencies had insisted on clear legal authority akin to that provided by laws to combat terrorism finance. On January 10, President Putin signed into law a bill on special economic measures that had been passed by the State Duma at the end of 2006. This law provided the necessary legal basis to combat proliferation financing. Interagency drafters of the presidential decrees (on Iran and the DPRK) were now consulting with State Duma members to ensure compliance with the legislation's intent.

[1](#)3. (C) After reviewing the drawn out negotiations in the Security Council over the text of UNSCR 1737, Safronkov cautioned that the GOR would use a "strict interpretation" to determine what was permitted or excluded by the resolution. He underlined that appeals for implementation based on "the spirit of the resolution" were not likely to gain much traction in Moscow. Russia had been very clear about what it could accept in the resolution text and intended to fully live up to its obligations to implement those provisions.

[1](#)4. (C) Comment: While the delays in implementing UNSCR 1737 are disappointing, our MFA interlocutors went out of their way to insist that Russia was committed to implementing UNSCR 1737 as soon as it was legally possible to do so. That said, even in the absence of serious policy differences, the Russian interagency process can move at a snail's pace. At the same time, we have seen over the past week increasing signs of Russian exasperation with Iran's failure to respond to the "time out" proposal launched by IAEA DG Baradei and supported by Russia. Visiting Congressman Tom Lantos heard from both FM Lavrov and Security Council Secretary Ivanov (septels) that the GOR was frustrated with Iranian

"arrogance." The Russians are claiming publicly that work cannot be completed on the Bushehr reactor because of delays in payment, but privately, Ivanov told Lantos that Russia would condition fuel delivery to Bushehr based on political considerations.

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